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I. Introduction 
The creation of the European Union and European Integration has prompted many 
questions about how sovereignty operates and what is necessary for a body to be considered 
sovereign. The traditional Weberian definition of the state and sovereignty as “the form of 
human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly on legitimate physical 
violence.”  This definition has persisted over time and is highly influential to the way 1
sovereignty and the role of the state are viewed. The creation and operations of the European 
Union have created a space where conversation about state sovereignty are diverging from the 
Weberian norm. This is because the structure of the EU contradicts the previous understandings 
of what were immutable characteristics of sovereign state bodies.  
The European Union is developing a new form of non-state sovereignty which diverges 
from traditional conceptions in three ways: The EU is a non-state actor; unlike in the past, a body 
is operating with and exercising sovereign rights outside of the nation-state formation. Secondly, 
the sovereignty of both the European Union and its member states overlaps. Both maintain 
exclusive responsibilities often tied to the state, but with the EU also taking over some essential 
functions of the state and sharing some responsibilities with the member states. Finally, the state 
no longer has a monopoly on the security apparatus within the state; the EU has an influence on 
the makeup of the police and military in individual countries within its domain. Despite these 
divergences from what is traditionally considered necessary for a body to be sovereign, the E.U. 
has created a structure which is de facto sovereign.  
1 Weber, M. (2004) ​The Vocation Lectures.​ Eds. D. Owen, D. Strong; translated by R. 
Livingstone.  Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company. 33. 
4 
A. History of the European Union 
The European Union grew out of a series of communities and organizations preceding it 
which brought together the great powers of Europe. The first of these was the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) which eventually evolved into the European Union of today. Proposed 
in 1950 by French Minister Robert Schuman, the ECSC was designed to make war between 
Germany and France “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”  The wake of World 2
War II was the backdrop of the creation of a united European community and thus made the idea 
put forth by Schuman of the utmost importance in the creation of a European community. The 
six founding countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) 
were committed to the idea was that by integrating the steel and coal industries in Europe no 
single country would be able to amass a supply sufficient enough to wage war without the other 
countries in the community noticing.  
The ECSC was established as an economic community and while it was political in its 
development and goals, its functions were economic. Later, after several failed attempts at 
creating political and defense communities (European Political Community and European 
Defence Community, respectively), the European Economic Community (EEC) was formed. The 
European Atomic Energy Community was formed at the same time in 1957 with the signing of 
the Treaty of Rome.  The formation of the European Union had many organizations which 3
preceded and which helped to cement the idea of a unified European supranational body. This 
2 Schuman, R. (2005). ​Declaration of 9 may 1950: The schuman plan for european integration​. In 
N. W. Karmis D. (Ed.), ​Theories of federalism: A reader​ (pp. 203-205). New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
3 Europa.eu. A peaceful europe – the beginnings of cooperation. Retrieved from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en 
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helped usher in the European Union and give it legitimacy in the eyes of the people and the 
governments of the individual member states.  
The European Union in its modern form was created in February of 1992 when the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed. The EU milestone set “clear rules for the future single currency as 
well as for foreign and security policy and closer cooperation in justice and home affairs.”  The 4
single market of the European Union was established on four pillars: the free movement of 
goods, services, people, and money. By 1995 the Schengen Agreement entered into force and 
allowed for the free movement of citizens from seven member countries with no passport control 
between the countries. 1997 marked the expansion of the powers and agreement in the 
Maastricht treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty laid out EU institutional reform, and gave the Union 
more power to work on EU issues such as citizen employment and citizen’s rights.  
The history of the European Union is an evolution, starting with one organization and 
morphing into others as it grew. But the responsibilities of the community, eventually the Union, 
and the number of member states has constantly been in flux over the course of the last seventy 
years. The nature of constant change is embedded in the history and the character of the 
European Union. This makes it unsurprising that this community has also changed the way 
sovereignty operates in Europe. As a powerful organization of member states, and powerful in its 
own right, the European Union will continue to have a broad impact on the world and on the 
member states within the Union.  
 
4 Europa.eu. Europe without frontiers. Retrieved from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1990-1999_en 
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II. Literature Review 
Questions of sovereignty have plagued political discussion around the world since the 
beginning of its creation and implementation. Some accept the common platitude that state 
sovereignty was created along with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Others argue that that it 
manifested even earlier;  or perhaps much later, even as recent as the twentieth century.  5 6
Regardless of these and other musings on when the idea came to the fore, it is clear by the 
prevalence of debate that sovereignty has long been a charged topic both theoretically and 
practically and continues to be to this day. With the lengthy history of academic and political 
debate over the construction and fate of sovereignty, it is helpful to break it down. The first 
section of this literature review will cover the ways that sovereignty has shifted over time, and 
more specifically in the last several decades. Some of the changes which have prompted shifts in 
sovereignty have also been involved in the creation and development of the European Union. 
Also important to the concept of sovereignty is how it interacts with security, military, and 
policing. The concept of monopoly of force as presented by Weber and others in relation to 
sovereignty fits into the conversation on security, the military and policing. All of these combine 
to set the backdrop for the creation of a new form of sovereignty being shaped and formed by the 
creation and operations of the European Union.  
 
5 Bueno de Mesquita, B. 2000. ​Popes, Kings and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of 
Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty.​ International Studies Review 2: 93–118. 
Hinsley, F. H. 1986. ​Sovereignty​. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Spruyt, H. 1994. ​The Sovereign State and its Competitors.​ Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
6 Croxton, D. 1999. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty. The 
International History Review 21: 569–91. 
Krasner, S. D. (2001). Sovereignty. ​Foreign Policy​, 20-29. 
7 
A. Shifting Sovereignty 
The 21st century has seen changes in the international system and how people, 
corporations, and states interact in the international political sphere and global markets. Interstate 
interactions often center around security and how states protect their own interests, citizens, and 
borders. This has long been defined by ideas of sovereignty and the agency that governments 
have to act without international interference and intervention. But certain trends in state action 
and international relations as a whole have created questions over the relevancy of traditional 
understandings of state sovereignty.  
The traditionally accepted definition of sovereignty assured states’ exclusive control over 
their defined territory without the threat of arbitrary interference from outside forces. This 
definition of sovereignty originated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the Thirty 
Years’ War. Though an old concept, this idea has not only shaped how policies on intervention 
have evolved, but also the idea of the nation-state itself. Some definitions of sovereignty are 
more oriented towards the modern day, referencing institutions that were non-existent at the time 
of the Thirty Years War.  The traditional definition of sovereignty stemming from the 7
seventeenth century has been challenged in many ways, including the interceding redefining of 
the concept, and also the increasing interconnectedness of the world which has cause 
7 ​R. Niblett defines sovereignty this way: “At its most basic level, sovereignty is the legal status 
that all states possess when they are recognized by their peers through the United Nations, 
reflecting their jurisdiction over a territory and the permanent population living there.” 
Niblett, R. (2016). Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth. ​Chatham House The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs​, ​19​. 
Crawford, J. (2012). Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 447–48. 
8 
reconceptualization of its own. Starting at the end of the last century, and certainly in the 
beginning of the 21st century, discussions over how understandings and expressions of 
sovereignty have been altered in a changing and globalizing world have been crafted and 
published extensively.  
Few, if any, notable scholars argue that notions of sovereignty have been static since their 
original conceptualization in the 1600s. But there is great variance among scholars on exactly 
what changes have occurred and what has been their cause.​ ​Many explanations are offered 
including the the creation of the institutions of the international human rights regime which 
scholars like Saskia Sassen (1995) and Louis Henkin (1999) claim have contributed to shifts in 
sovereignty by changing the relationship between states, and changing how states interact with a 
supranational power.  Globalization has also opened communication channels, changed market 8
interactions, and allowed for multinational corporations that operate outside of the jurisdiction of 
any one state. The changing time have created a changing sovereignty, but there are still some 
characteristics of sovereignty which have remained central to the idea.  
Part and parcel with the idea of sovereignty and states having territorial control is the role 
of the state itself, particularly as it relates to the economy. Globalization and the rise of 
supranational organizations have had impacts beyond just the political. Increasing 
interconnectedness through technology has allowed for faster communication, faster exchange 
and transportation of goods, and the expansion of international capital markets. Due to these 
8 ​Henkin, L. (1999). That “S” word: Sovereignty, and globalization, and human rights, et cetera. 
Fordham Law Review, 68​(1), 1-14. 
Jackson, J. H. (2003). Sovereignty-modern: A new approach to an outdated concept.​ The 
American Journal of International Law, 97​(4), 782-802. 
Sassen, S. (1996). ​Losing control? sovereignty in the age of globalization​. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
9 
shifts, scholars are arguing for not only the diminished importance of the concept of sovereignty, 
but in some cases the wholesale devaluation of the nation-state as an actor in the international 
economy.  The importance of the nation-state as a unit and center for activity in the new world 9
economy is under review. Paul Taylor who suggests the renewal of the concept of World Cities, 
and their ability to eschew some of the costs and difficulties socially and militarily that 
nation-states have to endure.  Saskia Sassen makes a similar argument that a place-centered 10
system is taking the place of the old system. Sassen’s place-centered system would have 
financial centers and other hubs of activity take a increasingly central role in the world economy, 
but are not tied to the concept of the nation-state as they are in the current system.  Another 11
theory in this vein is Kenichi Ohmae’s consideration of the rise of regional economies. He 
argues, like Taylor and Sassen, that the nation-state as a unit has lost its importance, but he 
contests that in its place, regional economies have taken hold and usurped control as they once 
did back in the days of regional dominance in Italy, Germany, and other (mainly European) hubs. 
The European Union, OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), NAFTA (North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement), and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), among 
others, operate in regional units to carry out political and economic agreements on an 
9 Ohmae, K. (1995). The end of the nation state: the rise of regional economies. New York: Free 
Press.  
Sassen, S. (1995). The state and the global city: Notes towards a conception of place centered 
governance. Competition and Change, 1(1), 31-50. 
Brown, W. (2010). ​Walled states, waning sovereignty​. New York, NY: Zone Books. 
10 ​Taylor, P. (1995). World cities and territorial states: the rise and fall  of their mutuality. In 
Knox, P and Taylor, P, ​World cities in a world system​. Cambridge, UK. Cambridge University 
Press. 48-61. 
11 ​Sassen, S. (1995). The state and the global city: Notes towards a conception of place centered 
governance.​ Competition and Change, 1​(1), 31-50. 
10 
international and regional scale.  Some of these regional units are primarily economic, but 12
others like the EU, are also political. Their emphasis within this theory further support the altered 
state of the role of sovereignty, politically and economically.  
There is a strong argument within the literature that not only is the nation-state system 
shifting, it is crumbling. Wendy Brown speaks directly to this point stating that with the slow 
deterioration of the old system of sovereign nation states, governments are doing whatever they 
can to keep a hold on the land and resources within their borders.  This changing world order 13
doesn’t sit well with many modern nations, who are trying anything and everything to secure 
their borders. Mike Davis agrees with Brown in his assessment of the U.S.-Mexico border 
barrier, dubbing it a “hyperbolic assertion of nation-state sovereignty.”  Governments are trying 14
to regain control over a global system that is leaving the old idea of nation states and walls 
behind.  Jean-Jacques Roche explores the idea of the place of walls in a globalizing world, 
saying that walls have no place as they are “ill-adapted” to this new world order.  The 15
increasing presence of border walls is a manifestation of the uncertainty born from the turn of the 
century changes to the global political and economic system. R. Niblett fires back at states trying 
to assert this hyper-securitized version of sovereignty, calling the idea of absolute sovereignty 
“illusory.”  Nation states are attempting to go back to a system of absolute sovereignty through 16
12 ​Ohmae, K. (1995). ​The end of the nation state: the rise of regional economies. ​ New York: Free 
Press.  
13 Brown, Wendy.​ Walled States, Waning Sovereignty​. New York, NY: Zone Books, 2010. 
14 Davis, Mike. "The Great Wall of Capital." In ​Against the Wall: Israel's Barrier to Peace​, 
edited by Sorkin, Michael, P. 88. New York, NY: New Press, 2005. 
15 Roche, Jean-Jacque, “Walls and Borders in a Globalized World: The Paradoxical Revenge of 
Territorialization ,” in ​Border Regions Series: Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity?​. 
ed. Elizabeth Vallet, p.121 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016). 
16 ​Niblett, R. (2016). Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth. ​Chatham House The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs​, ​19​. 
11 
hyper-securitization which is idealized for absolute control over borders and security. In practice, 
this system was never actually a reality, and as such cannot be achieved now, especially in a 
world as interconnected as the one we have today. This system has been shown by previously 
mentioned authors to have shifted, whether or not they agree on how those shifts have 
manifested. It is from this upheaval that the current and new trends have been born. These 
attitudinal shifts are what make the emergence of the new sovereignty of the European Union so 
surprising. The aspirational idea of unity fires back in the face of increased want for separation, 
regardless of internal rhetoric calling for it.  
Central to any discussion on sovereignty in the modern era are Carl Schmitt’s arguments 
in ​Nomos of the Earth ​(1950).  Schmitt describes the period of 1492 to 1890 as a time of nomos, 17
meaning “law” or “custom.” This was a time in which the world was held under the European 
sphere of influence and control. But the nomos began to unravel in the 1890s with the carving up 
of Africa and the entry of the U.S. into the international world sphere. This led to a disruption of 
the Eurocentric world order of the previous four centuries, thus preserving order in the world 
became increasingly difficult, and led to the construction of such supranational institutions as the 
United Nations, the European Union, and others. Schmitt argues that before 1890 European 
power centers conducted themselves in anyway they saw fit in their colonial territories. Through 
“bracketing,” the colonial powers could do whatever they wanted in their territories in order to 
maintain order in their home countries. The power of the European countries in their various 
colonies and conquered territories infringed upon the ability of those areas to organize into their 
own sovereign states. After this period described by Schmitt, the European powers now have to 
17Schmitt, C. (2006). ​The nomos of the earth in the international law of the jus publicum 
europaeum​ (G. L. Ulmen Trans.). (reprint ed.) Telos Press. 
12 
find a new way to operate in the world system as they no longer have access to colonies in the 
same way where they can act however they choose in order to maintain order in the home 
countries. States are now attempting to exert control over  their own borders in the same way that 
they once exerted control over their colonial subjects. What is most ironic about the Schmitt’s 
hypotheses in relation to the current moment is that now the European Union is exerting control 
over its member states and closing in on the sovereignty of those member states. As will be 
shown later in this paper, the sovereignty of the European Union overlaps with that of the 
member states in a way that restricts the ability of the member states to exercise their own 
sovereign powers.  
Much of the literature that was written on the implications for sovereignty in the age of 
globalization, politically and economically, came out of the turn of the last century. It reflects a 
time of change and of questioning the new world order in a world more interconnected in every 
way than ever before. Scholars question whether or not sovereignty is fundamentally altered by 
the changing world and the changing circumstances that surround it.  This thesis takes these 
ideas and contributes to them by examining the present practices of sovereignty at a new point in 
history. In particular, it examines how some new practices of sovereignty are expressed in the 
formation and practices of the European Union.  
 
B. Arguments of sovereignty in the EU 
Aside from broader discussions on sovereignty, sovereignty in the European Union has 
been widely discussed in a specific manner. Joan Cocks notes that “sovereignty today is widely 
13 
seen as the prerequisite and inner substance of a freely lived life.”  But many people see 18
sovereignty as an unchanging concept and also as one closely linked to freedom. What they fail 
to recognize, and what Cocks points out is that “...sovereignty might have its logical end point 
not in freedom but in discrimination, persecution, even genocide. That a struggle for sovereignty 
could signify freedom for one group and obliteration for another…”  What the European Union 19
has found and created in their new form of sovereignty is a way to include many, to the benefit 
of the greatest number, into one system which maintains sovereignty without having to dismantle 
any group within. As it related to Cocks’ point, though no group had to be obliterated at the 
expense of European sovereignty, it did come at the cost of some sovereignty of all of the 
countries involved. Buying into the system entails the sacrifice of some internal sovereignty, in 
order to benefit the whole. In that way, Cock’s point stands; that in the service of greater 
European sovereignty, the powers of any given country are curtailed in part.  
The creation of the European Union and the establishment of its sovereignty is at odds 
with the way Carl Schmitt describes land appropriation as a constitutive political event. He 
underlines this process as essential to the creation of a political body, and thereafter keeping a 
country and society in order. But the structure of the European Union has shown that this body 
without territory (though it presides over many countries, it doesn’t have defined borders of its 
own) can operate and function to control the population within as well as contribute as an 
international actor.  
Even still, there has been some resistance to individual countries giving up some of their 
sovereignty for to the good of the whole of the European Union. Brexit, the British referendum 
18 ​Cocks, J. (2014). ​On sovereignty and other political delusions ​. New York: Bloomsbury. 36. 
19 ​Cocks, J. (2014). ​On sovereignty and other political delusions ​. New York: Bloomsbury. 23. 
14 
vote to leave the E.U., which has been plodding along in negotiations over the last two years 
represents a push back from an EU member state to reclaim their sovereignty. “Many argued that 
the EU’s transnational governing system over-regulated Great Britain, while at the same time 
elevated foreign and corporate interests above Britain’s own. This sacrifice of parliamentary 
sovereignty to a continental body, they argued, was detrimental to state agency.”  Many of the 20
voters in the UK who supported the referendum were the very people who were left behind by 
the economic benefits of EU membership. Older, lower skilled workers who had been excluded 
from the opening of markets with membership to the EU had the opportunity to seize choice to 
take back what they saw as the sovereignty that had been given away.  This compliments Joan 21
Cocks’ description of the want for sovereignty and how it has become the yardstick by which all 
international power is measured. Brexit is just one example of a larger trend of right wing 
movements across Europe which are pushing back against the expanding power of the European 
Union and its ability to usurp individual national interest.  
Against the backdrop of the 2016 referendum for the United Kingdom to exit the 
European Union, R. Niblett commented on the the state of sovereignty in the U.K. as it relates to 
their relationship with the E.U. Niblett makes the point that sovereignty does not ensure the 
security of a state: “A sovereign government can be overthrown by a revolution or insurgency, 
and its state can be broken into pieces by separatist movements.”  Since states are still subject to 22
20 ​Anker, E., & Youmans, W. (2017). Sovereign aspirations: National security and police power 
in a global era. Theory & Event, 20(1), 12. 
21 ​Guàrdia, Arnau Busquets , “How Brexit Vote Broke Down,” Politico, June 24, 2016. 
   Higgins, A., “Wigan’s Road to ‘Brexit’: Anger, Loss and Class Resentments,” The New York 
Times, July 5, 2016. 
22 ​Niblett, R. (2016). Britain, the EU and the Sovereignty Myth. ​Chatham House The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs​, ​19​. 2-3. 
15 
outside forces, even as they are sovereign, they often choose to sign agreements, treaties, and 
join organizations (like NATO, the UN and any conventions created therein) which some may 
purport curtail sovereignty, but which in effect support the security of the states. Essentially 
states have accepted that absolute sovereignty is less important than peace and security. These 
international agreements and small concessions of sovereignty constitute a supranational power 
separate from that of the sovereign state. This is described by Jurgen Habermas not as eclipsing 
that of the nation state, but as co-existing alongside it, with neither being dominant over the 
other.   23
At its basic level, the agreements for states to join the European Union involves 
provisions which preserve a large degree of the state’s sovereign rights. Although the Union has 
powers of collective bargaining and the necessity of cooperation, countries still maintain the 
ability to shape the construction of the regulations put in place. Additionally, national 
parliaments have the final say over the implementation of E.U. regulations in their state because 
they have to be ratified by the parliaments.  These measures were all put in place in order for the 24
member states to maintain some of their sovereignty despite entering into an agreement of 
collective action politically, economically, and socially. Nevertheless, subsequent agreements 
and amendments have given the EU broader power to ‘assist’ and regulate in areas where 
member states are unable, or preclude member states from regulating in areas where the EU has 
already done so. So despite measures to preserve the sovereignty of individual member states, 
the EU has been able to grow around them and expand their capacity.  
23 ​Habermas, J. (2012). ​The crisis of the European Union: A response ​. Polity. 
24 ​European Union (2007), ‘Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community’, Articles 28 and 29, OJ C 306, 13 December 
2007. 
16 
Sovereignty in the European Union has been discussed and challenged, especially in 
recent years. In the lead up to and the wake of the U.K. vote to leave the E.U. many questions 
have been asked about the cost of being a member of the E.U. and what it means for member 
state sovereignty. This thesis will show that that along these lines, a new form of sovereignty has 
arisen out of the European Union which builds upon the individual powers of the singular 
member state.  
C. Sovereignty and military force/policing  
Max Weber  characterized the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, known 25
more commonly as the monopoly of force, as the feature which distinguishes states from other 
political formations. According to Markus Jachtenfuchs, ​“The monopoly of force is a 
precondition for the emergence of complex social interactions that rely on interpersonal and 
intertemporal trust.”  The concept of the monopoly of force is regarded as an important guiding 26
concept in what makes a state and a sovereign body; it is essential for preserving control and a 
state’s control over its own people and borders. Additionally,​ considering the emerging 
international influences on state control and the monopoly of force is essential in considering the 
relevancy, legitimacy, and power of sovereignty as a concept.  
Historically, Thomas Hobbes theorized that people required the rule of a sovereign power 
holding the monopoly of force to maintain order and provide for the good of the people. This 
sovereign power would prevent the emergence of failed states as the sovereign would have the 
right to the use of violence in any capacity. According to Hobbes, this was essential in order to 
25 Weber, M. (1965). Politics as a Vocation. 
26  ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 38. 
17 
escape the State of Nature and prevent the war of all against all.  Weber, writing nearly three 27
centuries later, took a view more centered around the State than the sovereign. Instead of 
emphasizing the state’s capacity to do whatever is necessary in the avoidance of the war of all 
against all, Weber focussed on the state’s legitimate use of violence and force, and the monopoly 
of force which states maintain. Writing much more recently, Jachtenfuchs concludes that 
presently there is no alternative to the state as the controller of the monopoly of force, be it an all 
powerful sovereign or otherwise. Despite the claim that any organizations which facilitate 
internationalization and policies of responsibility sharing, these to do not fundamentally alter the 
concept of state monopoly of force. Rather than losing their claim to the monopoly of force 
overall, states are losing their ability to legitimately use their right to the monopoly of force. This 
is happening through the embedding of monopoly of force into international institutions.   28
The concept of monopoly of force distinguishes two subsects of how the state is able to 
execute their force, this is either through the military or the police. The military acts as the 
outward facing manifestation, being used traditionally in international capacities and away from 
the domestic arena.  On the other hand, the police focus the power of the state inward and their 
purview is primarily regarded as domestic in scope. Globalization and the modern era has 
blurred the lines between these two, with many police forces becoming increasingly militarized, 
and national militaries carrying out operations on domestic soil. ​A more interconnected world 
has shifted the scope of many transactions to a level that exists outside of traditional state control 
27 Hobbes, T. (1968). ​Leviathan: Edited with an Introd. by CB Macpherson​. Penguin Books. 
28 ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 49. 
18 
and which also goes beyond the reach of the state.  Some use the shifting of how the police and 29
the military operate as evidence of a new shift in global politics and the structure of nation-states.
 Michael Hardt argues that the events of 9/11 caused a shift in how sovereignty is expressed 30
and how it operates; arguing that it shifted from something existing under a structure of 
nation-states instead to a “new global sovereignty.”  This new global sovereignty operates 31
outside the sphere of the traditional nation state and without regard for territorial division. As 
Anker and Youmans put it, Hardt “joins other seminal scholars of sovereignty, including Giorgio 
Agamben and Wendy Brown, to argue that sovereignty has detached from state power to expand 
across the globe, whether through Empire (Hardt and Negri), worldwide productions of bare life 
(Agamben), or neoliberal capital as the new sovereign (Brown).”   32
The change in how police and military are used and how they operate is also seen in the 
large scale privatization of militaries around the world. This is especially prevalent in the United 
States. Brinkman and Brinkman use this trend as evidence to claim that sovereignty is dead as a 
result of the sacrifice of the state monopoly of force to private corporations.  Nevertheless, not 33
every scholar agrees that the shifts described by Hardt actually represent a shift to something that 
is entirely new and apart from state sovereignty, it may perhaps be just a new expression of the 
29 ​Henkin, L. (1999). That “S” word: Sovereignty, and globalization, and human rights, et cetera. 
Fordham Law Review, 68​(1), 1-14. 
30 ​Hardt, M. (2001). Sovereignty. Theory & Event. 5(4). 
31  ​Hardt, M. (2001). Sovereignty. Theory & Event. 5(4). 
32 ​Anker, E., & Youmans, W. (2017). Sovereign aspirations: National security and police power 
in a global era. Theory & Event, 20(1), 3-18. 
Hardt, M., & Negri, A. (2001). ​Empire​. Harvard University Press. 
Agamben, G. (1998). ​Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life​. Stanford University Press. 
Brown, W. (2017). ​Walled states, waning sovereignty​. Mit Press. 
33 ​Brinkman, R. L., & Brinkman, J. E. (2008). Globalization and the Nation-State: dead or Alive. 
Journal of Economic Issues​, ​42​(2), 425-433. 
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old system. Anker and Youmans push back against Hardt, arguing that “State sovereignty has, in 
many instances, re-oriented the monopoly of violence back inside territorial boundaries, 
targeting individuated threats, communities, and bodies that are presumed to threaten from 
within.”  Where Hardt claims a new global sovereignty, Anker and Youmans see a sovereignty 34
which is exercised harshly by the state over its own people through such mechanisms as 
“widespread surveillance, police militarization, and mass incarceration”  Despite Hardt’s 35
claims, ​countries largely maintain control over their military and police forces sometime through 
the means described by Anker and Youmans. Countries that are not able to maintain control over 
their military or police are considered failed states by the international system and constitutes a 
failure by the state to maintain the monopoly of force.  
Political and economic formations like NATO, the European Union, the OECD, and 
others chip away at a state’s abilites to explain and legitimize their use of force because of 
international obligations under treaty regimes, or obligations to other states through alliances. 
The E.U. has developed mechanisms, some of which fall under the purview of NATO, that pool 
the sovereignty of individual states. “The institutions that the EU has developed in order to deal 
with military affairs only pool sovereignty, they do not delegate it. Nevertheless, they release the 
use of force from complete state control.”  Though Jachtenfuchs seems wary of the implications 36
of the countries in the European Union voluntarily releasing some of their control and ability to 
oversee the monopoly of the use of force in their country, others like Robert Keohane see this 
34 ​Anker, E., & Youmans, W. (2017). Sovereign aspirations: National security and police power 
in a global era. Theory & Event, 20(1), 4. 
35 ​Anker, E., & Youmans, W. (2017). Sovereign aspirations: National security and police power 
in a global era. Theory & Event, 20(1), 5. 
36  ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 45. 
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release of power as a concept of pooled sovereignty and power which member states have 
bought into.   37
Some authors theorize that an ultimate blow to states’ monopoly of force would be 
regionalized, or at least collectivized military or police forces. Either one, be it a regional army 
within a country, or one which spans multiple countries could, to some, be considered a 
disintegration of the monopoly of force;  “[a] Bavarian, Scottish or Basque army would be as 
revolutionary as a European army.”  Jachtenfuchs places strong emphasis on the point that 38
although we are unlikely to see the formation of an European army operating as a single entity, at 
least not anytime soon, the countries of the European Union are moving in a direction which 
sacrifices absolute control for international cooperation.   39
They are bound under such political and economic systems mentioned before like NATO, 
the European Union, the OECD and others. This “system of norms and institutions regulating the 
use of the means of force” is more rigorous and requires more diligence than the “general and 
universal UN-based system.”  It incorporates  Article 5 of the NATO treaty which includes the 40
stipulation that force be used in the defense of an allied country and members are obligated to act 
in the case of attack against other members.  Jachtenfuchs notes that “This falls short of the plan 
for an integrated European army, which failed in 1954, but goes considerably beyond a purely 
37 ​Keohane, R. (2002). Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States. 
Journal Of Common Market Studies​, 40(4), 743-765. 
38  ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 39. 
39 Forster, A.; Wallace, W. (2000) Common foreign and security policy. From shadow to 
substance? In H. Wallace and W. Wallace (Eds) Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press): 461–491. 
40   ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business 
as usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 45. 
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defensive alliance in which members participate on a strictly voluntary basis and are entirely free 
to determine their policies.”  It seems that states would and do push back against the 41
collectivization of their police and military, but still their actions of entering into agreements 
which diminish their ability to act entirely on their own to maintain the monopoly of force 
internally and externally demonstrate a will toward collective action to protect their countries 
most effectively.  
Indeed, formalized collective police action has an established history. One such 
organization, Interpol was founded in 1923, speaking to the long history of collectivized 
policing.  Nevertheless the organization is constructed in such a way that it does very little to 42
restrict the action of member states. As most countries in the world are members, there is little 
ability for states to act independently through the mechanisms of Interpol. Instead it acts largely 
as an intelligence gathering and sharing organization.  43
Stanley Hoffman once referred to the state as resembling an artichoke, though its outer 
layers can be stripped away with little resistance (by the international community, in the case of 
the state) getting to the core is much harder and the state will protect it fiercely.  Echoing this 44
sentiment in “Scratching the heart of the artichoke? How international institutions and the 
European Union constrain the state monopoly of force” the authors note that “as it is their core 
sovereign power, states will protect their monopoly of force from external influence and attempt 
41  ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 45. 
42 ​Anderson, M., (1989) Policing the World. Interpol and the Politics of International Police 
Co-operation (Oxford: The Clarendon Press at Oxford University Press). 
43 ​Jachtenfuchs, M. (2005). 2 The monopoly of legitimate force: denationalization, or business as 
usual. ​European Review​, ​13​(S1), 37-52. 
44 ​Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of 
Western Europe. ​Daedalus​, 883-883. 
22 
to retain as much domestic policy autonomy as possible.”  This thesis will contribute to these 45
ideas showing that though individual states try to deny the will of the collective in order to 
maintain as much control over the monopoly of force as possible, in the end they are thwarted. 
Despite their best efforts to protect what they see as their core, states have at one point or another 
voluntarily surrendered a mite of the sovereign powers, and collectively this has led to the 
accumulation of power within the European Union system.  
Much has been written on the state of sovereignty in the modern era. Arguments over 
whether or not sovereignty is dead or stronger than ever remain unsettled. This thesis endeavors 
to add to the existing literature on the topic by showing that regardless of what other scholars say 
about how state sovereignty is operating in the present day, and how states attempt to hold on to 
the powers they see as unique to the individual nation-state, there is a new form of sovereignty 
emerging. This sovereignty is exemplified by the European Union and its pillars diverge from 
those of traditional state sovereignty. Additionally, the new form of sovereignty exemplified in 
the European Union has contributed to the rise of populism across the continent and member 
states of the EU. That said, the classification of the European Union as a de facto sovereign 
power could have farther reaching consequences towards the growing tide of hyper-nationalism 
across Europe.  
45 ​Herschinger, E., Jachtenfuchs, M., & Kraft-Kasack, C. (2011). Scratching the heart of the 
artichoke? How international institutions and the European Union constrain the state monopoly 




This paper uses the European Union as a case study to look at sovereignty and the 
formation of a new type of sovereignty which both diverges and interacts with existing state 
sovereignty. There are many different potential aspects to look at the in the formation of the type 
of sovereignty which has emerged in the European Union, in particular this case study examines 
three characteristics: the idea of the European Union is explored through the idea of the EU as a 
non state actor, and also the idea of public opinion and perception shaping which bodies are 
sovereign or not. The primary sources of data in this section are pulled for independent 
researchers looking at public opinion in Europe on the European Union, as well as the European 
Barometer surveys conducted by the EU. The European Barometer measures many things related 
to life in the European Union, but in particular this paper focuses on questions regarding how 
citizens within EU countries regard themselves as citizens of the EU, and how they view the EU.  
The second section focussing on the overlapping nature of European Union sovereignty 
looks at the duties and responsibilities of both the EU and its member states. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union provides the basis for this analysis. The table in this section 
demonstrates the different roles of the two bodies, and the points where they overlap. By looking 
at the defined responsibilities and abilities of the member states and the EU, and those that are 
shared show the overlapping nature of the sovereignty between the EU and member states. 
  The final section uses the example of Frontex and European external border security to 
show how the idea of overlapping sovereignty is crumbling, and instead the EU has more control 
over the national governments of the member states. Much of the analysis in the section comes 
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from looking at stated objectives and operations on the Frontex website. Additionally, this paper 
uses the findings of L. Marin in her analysis of Frontex joint operations at the southern maritime 
border of the European Union.  
These three sections seem at some points to be contradictory. But in fact what they show 
is that the sovereignty of member states and the European Union is supposed to be shared under 
the common system, but Frontex provides an example of how this is not the case in practice. The 
question this thesis is answer is: How does the existence of non-state sovereignty exist and 
interact with existing state sovereignty? As demonstrated in the three sections of the findings, the 
answer to this question depends on where you look. 
IV. Findings  
There are three characteristics which define the new type of sovereignty which has been 
created by the European Union and which distinguishes it from traditional conceptions and 
formations of sovereignty. The form of sovereignty created by the European Union is different in 
the following three ways: (1) it is not a traditional nation state actor. The EU is supranational and 
encompasses multiple member states. (2) The European Union and its member states share in 
sovereign duties, creating a system of overlapping sovereignty. This leaves both with some 
responsibilities and powers of traditional sovereignty, but neither with absolute sovereignty. (3) 
The final distinguishing factor of the European Union’s distinct form of sovereignty is the shared 
nature of border security and policing. The supranationalization of EU security and border policy 
takes away from individual member states’ monopoly of force and the ability to control all 
policy relating to national security. At the same time, supranationalization also allows the 
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European Union as a whole to enforce its own collective will on the member states. Conversely, 
the nature of shared policing and border patrol allows the European Union to create and 
implement shared policing policy without necessitating that the European Union maintain the 
monopoly of force in entirety over all of its member states, leaving some of the duties to the 
member states.  
This findings section will be divided into three parts discussing each of the three key 
components of European Union Sovereignty. The first will explore the idea of the EU as a 
sovereign power and a non-state actor. The sovereignty of the European Union has been strongly 
influenced by the integration of Europe in the creation of the EU as a non-state actor. 
Furthermore, this section will explore the idea of public perception, and how the view that the 
people have of the reach of the EU and its abilities shapes and gives legitimacy to EU 
sovereignty. Brexit will act as one case study showing how the increasing nationalist sentiment 
across Europe is impacted by the power of EU Sovereignty. The second subsection of the 
findings will explore the idea of overlapping sovereignty. Specifically, this section will look at 
the powers and responsibilities of the EU and of the member states as defined by their guiding 
documents. The powers conferred to the EU are clearly defined in these documents, but in 
practice they go far beyond and frequently overlap with member states. The final section will 
focus on the idea of security, policing, and border patrol. Specifically, it will look into the 
creation and implementation of the EU organization of Frontex and its operations regarding 
migration in Southern European countries and in the Mediterranean. This subsection will 
highlight how organizations like Frontex remove some of the monopoly of force of the 
individual EU member states and construct a supranational security and border patrol body.  
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An important factor across all of the components which make up European Union 
sovereignty is public perception. Many of the aspects that define this sovereignty are not codified 
into law or addressed explicitly in the founding and guiding documents of the European Union. 
But as the people of Europe view Europe as a unified entity with the power to reach past the 
powers of the member states to create overreaching regulation, then the EU has more capacity to 
make that happen. Since the sovereignty of the EU is de facto and not actually codified into law, 
the EU only really exists as sovereign if it is perceived as sovereign by the people.  
 
A. EU Integration: the European Union as a non-state actor and the creation of a body 
politic?  
One of the unique characteristics of the European Union which contributes to how it has 
changed the face of sovereignty is its status as a non-state actor. The traditional requirement of 
being a nation-state in order to have sovereignty has been confronted by the formation and 
growing power of the European Union as a political and economic entity. The collective power 
of the European Union gives it strength in the international arena and power to keep in line 
member states who might be more resistant to the collective policies set forth by the European 
Union. Through the integration processes and political formation, the European Union has 
created both a body politic and a strong supranational, political decision-making body. In order 
to become an effective organization, the European Union has had to undergo a transformation on 
the national level of individual member states and on the supranational level regarding the 
organization as a whole. But overall integration has created a union of states bonded together by 
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politics and economics, each with their own borders creating an area where the European Union 
has control in a cross-border formation.  
If “[t]he physical borders of a state define its territory, which is normally the area over 
which a state exercises its sovereignty,”  these borders act as the limits for a state’s jurisdiction. 46
In the case of the European Union, this definition is applicable aside from the identifier of 
“state.” The European Union is a multi-state, supranational body. Despite its non-state character, 
the European Union still has a territorial limit to its jurisdiction. The European Union diverges 
from the traditional conception of sovereignty in the sense that it is a non-state entity. The 
physical borders of a state normally define the area over which that state is able to exercise their 
sovereignty. But in the case of the 
European Union its jurisdiction does 
not cover only one state. It spans 
across all of the member states, and 
reaches farther than the traditional 
nation-state.  
The Schengen area opens up 
the borders within the EU, giving it 
state like characteristics, but still 
46 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 469. 
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making it distinct from the traditional state formation. The European Union has created a form of 
sovereignty which is not linked to nation-state status, and which isn’t bound by territory in the 
traditional way. But as shown above, it does maintain certain territorial characteristics linked to 
the external borders of its member states. Part of European Union membership for the majority 
of EU member states has involved joining the Schengen area. The original agreement was signed 
in 1985 by only a handful of the countries that are part of the European Union today and has 
since expanded to include all EU member states except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Romania and the United Kingdom, with Bulgaria and Romania currently in the process of 
joining Schengen.   47
In the Schengen acquis, the member states signing on agreed to work towards the 
“gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.”  Because of the policies in place under 48
the European Union “borders among [Member States] have lost most of their meanings with the 
enforcement of freedoms of movement. Lately, the Schengen process has achieved the removal 
of internal frontiers and the strengthening of external borders.”  The focus of the European 49
Union has been to bring down barriers between member states and create a vast area over which 
they maintain authority. The Schengen area diminishes the power of internal state borders and 
encourages, even requires, European Union countries to further protect external European Union 
47 European Commission. Schengen area. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en 
48The Schengen acquis.​ (14 June 1985). Retrieved from ​https://European Unionr-lex.European 
Unionropa.European 
Union/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42000A0922(01)&from=EN 
49 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 469.; See also Guild, E., Moving the Borders of 
Europe, inaugural lecture, available at www.jur.ru.nl/cmr/docs/oratie.eg.pdf; Groenendijk, C. A., 
Guild, E., & Minderhoud, P. E. (2003). In search of Europe's borders.  
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borders for the good of all of the other member countries within the Schengen area. Since this 
European Union policy has led to the decreased force of internal state borders and the increasing 
security of external European Union borders, the sovereignty of the European Union is still 
linked to defined territory.  
The many changes that have come with the creation of the Schengen area have led to 
changes for member states and how they maintain jurisdictional responsibilities as well as 
demonstrate their sovereignty.  This is what sets EU sovereignty apart from individual 50
nation-state sovereignty. Entering into the Schengen agreement is one piece in the larger puzzle 
of EU integration where the member states and the whole of the EU must balance the 
sovereignty of both to keep everybody happy. ​The process of EU integration can be traced back 
to early treaties and the creation of European economic communities following the devastation 
of World War II. The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community 
(EDC), the European Political Community (EPC), and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) among others all set the stage and laid the groundwork for the creation of the European 
Union. The process has been long and has encompassed many phases including all of the 
aforementioned organizations. Early on in the process of Integration, political decisions were 
beginning to be made at the supranational EU level, but the public sphere remained largely 
focused on national issues.  The political infrastructure was being put into place and decisions 51
50 ​ ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 470. 
51Gerhards, J. (2000). Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung 
einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. ​Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften. Sonderheft​, 
40​(2000), 277-305. 
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made on a large scale for all of the member states, but the people within individual member 
states were not yet involved in the decision making process or a part of identifying issues the 
Union should be focussing on. But over time, critical debate has arisen at the level of the general 
public across national borders to encompass an EU territory and people to debate EU issues.  52
Following the entry into force of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the body politic of the European 
Union was encouraged to engage in debate and political action in regards to the Union as a 
Barth, C., & Bijsmans, P. (2018). The Maastricht Treaty and public debates about European 
integration: the emergence of a European public sphere?. ​Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies​, 1-17. 
52 ​Grande, E., and S. Hutter. 2016. “The Politicisation of Europe in Public Debates on Major 
Integration Steps.” In Politicising European Union. Integration and Mass Politics, edited by S. 
Hutter, E. Grande, and H. Kriesi, 63–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Meyer, J.-H. 2010. The European Public Sphere. Media and Transnational Communication in 
European Integration 1969–1991. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. 
31 
whole and the process of Integration. This came after that period where little discussion was had 
over the nature and progress of EU integration and represents great progress toward creating a 
Union which would be effective in making policy relevant and reasonable across all member 
states. Once the Maastricht treaty conferred some power from the member states to the Union as 
a supranational body, people began to engage more vigorously in debate.   53
The emergence of an EU public sphere, defined by Barth and Bijsmans as “a publicly 
accessible communicative space in which EU affairs can be critically discussed”  lends 54
credibility to the idea of a unified EU political body under the European Union. One way which 
this can be measured is people’s feelings regarding their own personal membership to the 
European Union. Twice yearly since 1974, the European Union has conducted a survey called 
the European Barometer to gauge the public’s opinion on a wide variety of topics including 
receipt of benefits and services, immigration, identity, and citizenship, among others. In recent 
years they have asked people how they feel in regards to their citizenship and whether or not 
they feel they are citizens of the European Union. Figure 2 shows the results for the September 
2010 survey through the September 2015 survey. Nine surveys over five years show quite 
consistent results, with around 60% of respondents reporting that they feel at least somewhat of a 
citizen of the European Union.  Similar results have been found more recently in a Pew 55
53 ​Sternberg, C. (2013). ​The Struggle for European Union Legitimacy: Public Contestation, 
1950-2005​. Springer. 
54 ​Barth, C., & Bijsmans, P. (2018). The Maastricht Treaty and public debates about European 
integration: the emergence of a European public sphere?. ​Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies​, 1-17. 
55 European Commission, Directorate General for Communication. (Nov 2015). ​Standard 
eurobarometer 84 autumn 2015.​ ( No. 84). Retrieved from 
file:///C:/Users/Natalie/Downloads/eb84_citizen_en.pdf 
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Research Center survey  of ten EU countries in the spring of 2017. Following the Brexit 56
referendum it might seem natural that the view of the European populace would be turning away 
from the collectivity of the European Union. Instead, the Pew Research center found in a poll of 
9,935 respondents across ten countries that there was an upward trend in the favorability of 
European Union. Figure 3 shows the results of the survey displaying the positive trend in the 
view of the EU.  
56 Stokes, B., Wike, R., & Manevich, D. (2017). ​Global attitudes survey: Post-brexit, europeans 
more favorable toward EU.​ .Pew Research Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/post-brexit-europeans-more-favorable-toward-eu/ 
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Along with an overall increase in people’s positive view of the European Union, the Pew 
Research Center survey  shows that while European citizens have a more positive view of the 57
Union, they also want to have a say in whether or not they remain in the Union. Even if the 
populace has a strongly positive view of the Union as a whole and little desire to actually leave 
the EU, they want to have their voices heard insofar as their country deciding to stay in the 
Union. Across the ten countries surveyed, 42% to 65% of those citizens surveyed reported 
supporting a referendum on EU membership in their country (Figure 4).  These results point to a 
level of engagement in the process of EU membership. The people are not complacent in their 
57 Stokes, B., Wike, R., & Manevich, D. (2017). ​Global attitudes survey: Post-brexit, europeans 
more favorable toward EU.​ ().Pew Research Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/15/post-brexit-europeans-more-favorable-toward-eu/ 
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EU membership, nor do they wish to leave outright. They are asking to be engaged in the process 
of their country’s membership to the EU. This gives credibility to the European Union, showing 
that the the people are engaged in the process and are involved in the the European Union as a 
whole, and not just the politics and everyday life of their individual country.  
 If there is a body politic, there exists the basis for a sovereign entity, in this case, the 
European Union. The European Union populace is multinational, but its governance under the 
European Union remains firm. The European Union interacts with the governments of member 
states to create policy.  “the European Union as a multilevel governance system becomes an 
integral part of the “domestic” as well as the “transnational” realms.”  58
The European Council and the Council of the European Union (ECC) make up the 
executive and legislative center of European politics and decision making. One of the main 
things that they do is to promote “the general interest of the European Union by proposing and 
enforcing legislation as well as by implementing policies and the European Union budget.”  59
These three bodies have the power to make decisions on behalf of the Union which may be 
opposed by some member states and were never explicitly agreed to in any treaty; nevertheless, 
they are obligated to comply with them because of their membership to the whole. The members 
of the ECC make these decisions and function on the whole through collective governance. Jose 
Magone suggests that “one of the more remarkable traits of the ECC is the high proportion of 
legislative decisions taken by consensus without recourse to any formal vote at all.”  The ECC 60
58 Risse, T. (2015). “Introduction.” In European Public Spheres: Politics is Back, edited by T. 
Risse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. 
59Europa.eu.European commission overview. Retrieved from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-commission_en 
60 ​Magone, J. M. (Ed.). (2014). ​Routledge handbook of European politics.​ Routledge. 219. 
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is a system made up of national government officials involved in a myriad of policy issues and 
levels of seniority meeting together to solve issues and legislate on a supranational, European 
Union level. As Jose Magone notes, “in 2011, this included just under 4,600 official 
‘institutional’ meetings...with an operating budget of over 500 million euros.”  Through the 61
networked structure of the ECC, they have created a supranational body which can act and wield 
some level of autonomous power in the regulation of the European Union. The ability for this 
networked structure of many member states coming together to effectively and efficiently 
legislate on issues which affect the whole of the EU shows the power that the EU has created for 
itself through these institutions.  
B. Overlapping Sovereignty 
 
In modern times the idea of sovereignty has become less absolute than it was during the 
time of Thomas Hobbes and the Thirty Years War. The idea of absolute sovereignty has been 
eroded by international institutions and modern political structures. Nevertheless many states still 
hold on to their sovereignty and try to protect in the most absolute formation as possible. The 
European Union has gone the opposite direction and created a form of sovereignty which is 
shared and overlapping with member states. The sovereignty created by the European Union has 
created several sets of responsibilities for the member states and for the Union as a whole. But 
these duties aren’t always discrete, and sometimes converge.  
In this formation of sovereignty which is overlapping and shared, neither the member 
states or the European Union maintain exclusive sovereignty. The responsibilities of both are 
61 ​ ​Magone, J. M. (Ed.). (2014). ​Routledge handbook of European politics. ​ Routledge. 219. 
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referred to as competencies. The competencies of the EU, and the competencies of member 
states by extension, are defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
The four categories defined in the TFEU are: 
1. Exclusive competence (Article 3 TFEU);  
2. Shared competence (Article 4 TFEU) ; 
3. Competence to support, coordinate, or supplement actions of the member states (Article 6 
TFEU);  
4. Competence to provide arrangements within which EU member states must coordinate 
policy (Article 5 TFEU).   62
Exclusive competence describes certain areas where the EU maintains exclusive control, and is 
solely allowed to pass laws in those areas. In areas of exclusive competence “the role of member 
countries is limited to applying the law, unless the EU authorizes them to adopt certain laws 
themselves.”  Shared competencies allow both the EU and member states to pass laws which 63
apply to these areas. The caveat with shared competencies is that member countries can only 
regulate in these areas if the European Union has not already done so or if the EU has expressly 
said they will not regulate in that area. The shared categories include Freedom, Security, and 
Justice. In the case of this example, the EU has already implemented regulations in this area. As 
such, EU member states are severely limited in their ability to create legislation and enact laws 
relating to Freedom, Security and Justice. Even though this area is shared under the Treaty on the 
62 ​ European Union, ​Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union​, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b17a07e2.html 




Functioning of the European Union, in practice it becomes strongly regulated by the EU and very 
difficult for the member states to regulate themselves. The third competency does as it says and 
allows the European Union to “support, coordinate, or supplement actions of the member states.”
 Again, this is a category which contains largely shared competencies. Though they are 64
designed for the member states to take the lead, the EU still maintains a role in regulating these 
competencies. The last category of “competence to provide arrangements within which EU 
member states must coordinate policy” enables the EU to function in ways not normally allowed 
under treaties in areas such as: 
● coordination of economic and employment policies 
● definition and implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
● the ‘flexibility clause’, which under strict conditions enables the EU to take action 
outside its normal areas of responsibility   65
This category and its inclusion of common foreign and security policy gives the EU even broader 
power to regulate on security and supersede member states.  
These competencies describe the general categories of responsibilities taken on by the 
European Union, and in so doing also define the general categories that the member states are 
64 European Union, ​Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union​, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b17a07e2.html 




responsible for. Table 1 (below)  shows the distribution of specific functions to the member 66
states and to the European Union, as well as their shared competencies.  
 
Table 1: Powers Shared and Powers Divided: The breakdown of overlapping responsibilities of the 
European Union and its Member States 
Member States  Shared European Union 
Direct taxation Internal market Customs union 
Public health Social policy, limited to the aspects 
defined in the TFEU 
Concluding international 
agreements including trade 
Industry Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion 
Monetary policy for the member 
states whose currency is the euro 
Culture Area of freedom, security, and 
justice 
The establishing of the competition 
rules necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market 
Tourism Environment Common commercial policy 
Education and training, youth 
and sport 
Consumer protection Conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common 
fisheries policy 
Civil protection Transport  
Administrative cooperation Trans-European networks  
 Energy  
 Common safety concerns in public 
health matters, limited to the aspects 
defined in the TFEU 
 
66 ​Table 1 information collected from several sources including: European Commission. Areas of 
EU action. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas
-eu-action_en​; European Union, ​Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union​, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b17a07e2.html​; European Union, ​Consolidated version of the 
Treaty on European Union​, 13 December 2007, 2008/C 115/01, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b179f222.html​; 
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 Research, technological 
development, and space 
 
 Development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid 
 
 Agriculture and fisheries, excluding 




This original table shows that there are more categories which are shared between the 
member states and the European Union, and even that there are a few more duties which are 
assigned to the member states than those assigned to the European Union. But what the previous 
descriptions of the four competencies of the EU and the member states shows is that even if a 
category is defined as a shared competency, the EU often has broad power to influence the 
legislation in areas in which the member states have de jure control. There are specific powers 
which are taken away from the member states under the TEFU and given to the European Union, 
but there are also many powers which are ambiguously conferred as shared responsibilities and 
which, in practice, the EU has largely take control of.  
Through the shared nature of many of these areas of responsibility, the sovereignty of 
both the European Union and the member states is shared. Neither one is exclusive in most areas 
of control, whether it is that way by law or has evolved that way in practice, the sovereignty of 
the member states and the European Union overlaps.  
 
C. FRONTEX, the Mediterranean, and the Migrant Crisis 
The European Union maintains rights to shared policing, taking away the monopoly of 
force from the individual member states. One of the biggest instances of shared security policy 
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within the European Union in recent years has been over the issue of border security and action 
to stem the flow of migrants coming into the EU, especially through countries in the 
Mediterranean, like Greece, Italy, and Malta. Figure 6 shows the numbers of migrants entering 
the European Union at illegal border crossings. This demonstrates the extent of the crisis that the 
Union must handle. Policies of “Supranationalization” have moved the European Union towards 
a place where the individual member states often defer to an European Union body, in this case, 
the European Unionropean Border and Coast Guard Agency, an institution more commonly 
known as Frontex, in order carry out actions generally attributed to the state. These include 
operations like border patrol, rescue missions, and surveillance. This section will focus on the 
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influence of Frontex in the European Union particularly in the southern Mediterranean countries, 
and how that influence has added to the accumulation of non-state sovereignty of the European 
Union. 
Roberta Mungianu defines supranationalization as the process by which “centralized 
European Union governmental structures, here, the European Union institutions, exercise power 
on policy areas within the territory of the Member States as a consequence of the conferral of 
power from the Member States to the European Union within those policy areas.”  In the 67
process of supranationalization, as Mungianu notes, member states pass on some of their rights 
to the European Union body. The European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, more 
commonly known as Frontex, has been conferred rights by the member states to protect the 
external borders of the European Union. Frontex, along with other supranational agencies 
operating in and working to create security in Europe. Starting with the Maastricht treaty (1992) 
the European Union has formalized their cooperation regarding shared policing. The 
establishment of the Europol in 1995 continued this trend.  Frontex was formed in 2004 and has 68
been reformed several times since.  Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, ​Frontex now maintains a 69
67 ​Mungianu, R. (2013). Frontex: Towards a common policy on external border control. 
European Journal of Migration and Law​, ​15​(4), 359-385. 
Sweet, A. S., & Sandholtz, W. (1997). European integration and supranational governance. 
Journal of European public policy​, ​4​(3), 297-317. 
68 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 
69 ​Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ L 349/1; hereinafter: Frontex Regulation. 
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staff of about 315 and a budget of about 250M European euros.  ​This agency acting with powers 70
conferred by member states was set up as ten new countries were granted membership to the 
European Union in 2004. These countries, including Cyprus, Slovenia, and Malta, and their 
acceptance in the European Union were viewed fearfully by other member states who were 
highly skeptical of their ability to maintain external border integrity. Although explicit European 
Union cooperation on issues relating to borders and migration began in 1992 with the institution 
of the Maastricht treaty, such cooperation initially began in 1985 after it was developed by some 
European Union member states in the Schengen group.  Likewise, since the Tampere European 71
Council  developments in the European Union “have demonstrated recognition of the 72
importance of closer cooperation and mutual technical assistance between the border control 
services of the Member States.”   73
In order to address this perceived issue, other European Union member states drew 
together to strengthen border control policies. Tightening of border controls has also been an 
effective way to combat terrorism. According to their website, the main role of Frontex is to help 
“European Union countries and Schengen associated countries manage their external borders. It 
also to helps to harmonise border controls across the European Union. The agency facilitates 
70 ​European border and coast guard agency (Frontex). Retrieved from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en 
71 ​Monar, J. (2006). The External Shield of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Progress 
and Deficits of the Integrated Management of the External Borders. ​Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the European Union: Implementation of the Hague Programme​, 73-90. 
72 European Council, Tampere 15 and 16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions. 
73 ​Mungianu, R. (2013). Frontex: Towards a common policy on external border control. 
European Journal of Migration and Law​, ​15​(4), 359-385. 
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cooperation between border authorities in each European Union country, providing technical 
support and expertise.”   74
With the growing influence of Frontex and other organizations such as Europol, the 
European Union is growing as a multi-level governance system. Some scholars such as Deidre 
Curtin describe a “third wave” of agencies. Frontex is considered to be an example of these types 
of agencies which are ​“agencies with more overtly regulatory and far-reaching tasks in many 
instances.”  ​As a result, sovereignty is shifting, with the European Union and its supranational 75
institutions claiming their own sovereignty separate from the state. Marin notes that this process 
“has an impact also on policing: European integration added a transnational dimension to 
policing.”  76
Frontex is one institution which is consolidating power and the resources traditionally 
held by the state, by taking a whole network of actors which normally reside domestically and 
placing it under one umbrella institution. It does so with the aim to in “to increase cooperation, 
coordination, convergence and consistency between borders’ practitioners in the European Union 
74 ​ ​European border and coast guard agency (Frontex). Retrieved from 
https://Europa.eu/European-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en 
75 Curtin, D. (2009). ​Executive power of the European Union: law, practices, and the living 
constitution​ (Vol. 12). Collected Courses of the Acade. 
76 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 469. 
Walker, N. (2012). The pattern of transnational policing. In ​Handbook of policing​ (pp. 147-174). 
Willan. 
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MSs”  but is nevertheless changing the landscape of security in the European Union and the 77
individual member state’s monopoly of force in their own countries.  
Article 1 of the European Council document on integrated border management says that 
Frontex was created in the effort to “improv[e] the integrated management of the external 
borders of the Member States (…).” This concept was defined in a Council document  and was 78
endorsed by the European Council in December of 2006.  The roles of Frontex which are 79
encapsulated in “integrated border management” are as follows:  
a. Border control (checks and surveillance);  
b. Detection and investigation of cross-border crime;  
c. four-tier access control model which is comprised of measures in third countries 
(TC), neighboring country cooperation, border control, and measures to control 
movement;  
d. Inter-agency cooperation;  
e. Coordination and coherence on actions at European Union level.  
Frontex maintains that European Union countries which border non-European Union countries 
are solely responsible for their borders and that Frontex only offers support in efforts to maintain 
external border integrity by providing equipment like aircraft and boats, and trained border 
77  ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 472. 
78  Council document No 14202/06, draft Council conclusions on integrated border management. 
The concept has been previously referred at in Commission’s Communication -Toward 
integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
COM(2002)233 final, cit. 
79 Council Conclusions on Justice and Home Affairs Council, Brussels, 4-5 December 2006.  
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agents. On their website they describe their activities this way: “Frontex coordinates maritime 
operations (e.g. in Greece, Italy and Spain) but also at external land borders, including in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Slovakia. It is also present at many international airports across 
Europe.”  But looking further into the activities of Frontex, reveals that perhaps Frontex 80
operations aren’t solely supportive of the actions of member states, but often act in a way which 
sets the priority for certain operations, and Frontex takes a leading role in carrying out these 
operations.  
One such example described by Luisa Marin is Joint Operation Nautilus which was 
conducted in several parts from 2006-2009. This operation was conducted with the primary goal 
of stemming the flow of migrants through the Mediterranean and entering Europe. The primary 
areas of concern at the time were Italy and Malta, which at the time was not yet a member of the 
Schengen Agreement. The Frontex website provides scarce details on many of the portions of the 
operation, leaving the information gathering to non-governmental sources. However, the 
information that they do report differs vastly from information obtained and reported by NGOs 
and academic sources. Maritime forces working on the operation have denied the discrepancies 
which were primarily related to the number of migrants apprehended and the number who were 
deterred from making the journey.  Information regarding the organizational structure of the 81
operations was also missing from the reporting by Frontex. This lack of information has caused 
scholars to question the involvement of Frontex and their role as a support organization. Luisa 
80 ​European border and coast guard agency (Frontex). Retrieved from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en 
81 Klepp, S. , ‘A Contested Asylum System: the European Union between Refugee Protection 
and Border Control in the Mediterranean Sea’, (2010)12 European Journal of Migration and 
Law, 1, 16. 
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Marin questions the actions of Frontex, and their supposed supporting role in operations like 
Nautilus: “how can someone accept that there was no overlap among operational areas if Frontex 
operational plans remain secret?”   Furthermore, JO Nautilus was conducted without a clear 82
legal basis or code to return the migrants to their home countries. This was because at the time 
Malta was not a part of the Schengen Agreement and as such the Schengen Border code did not 
apply.  
Marin remains skeptical of the extent of the involvement of Frontex in operations like 
Nautilus. She implies that the reach and operations of the organization go further than are 
disclosed to the public.  Whether or not the operations of Frontex go beyond the international 83
law to infringe upon human rights, they certainly go beyond the authority of the member states in 
patrolling and conduction operations along the external borders of the European Union. Even 
still, Frontex operations are conducted with some joint effort by member states. Integrated border 
management is of utmost importance to Frontex and the European Union. Roberta Mungianu 
notes that this is one of two ways that sovereignty is shifting from member states to European 
Union institutions. The two ways that she identifies are: “(i) Frontex is called to the realization of 
the ‘integrated management system’; and (ii) it is required to carry our joint operations along 
with Member States.”  84
82 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 477. 
83 ​Marin, L. (2014). Policing the European Union's external borders: A challenge for the rule of 
law and fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex 
joint operations at the southern maritime border. 477. 
84 ​ ​Mungianu, R. (2013). Frontex: Towards a common policy on external border control. 
European Journal of Migration and Law​, ​15​(4), 384. 
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In February of 2018, a new year-long operation was launched by Frontex.  This 85
operation, called Themis changed the policy from a previous operation (Triton) which required 
all migrants rescued at sea to be taken to Italy even if there were ports, such as those in Malta or 
Greece that were closer. This policy was often and loudly protested by the Italian authorities, 
even leading them to introduce a plan to open other European Union ports to migrants. But they 
were often shot down by the leaders of other European Union countries.  Operation Themis 86
changed this policy and will now allow for migrants rescued at sea to be taken to the nearest safe 
port. Izabella Cooper, a spokeswoman for Frontex, told Reuters that in 2017 Frontex conducted 
operations in Italy, Greece, and Spain which rescued 38,000 people at sea and that the Frontex 
ships involved in the Themis operation will continue to carry out rescues in accordance with the 
new policy.   87
Italian authorities were bound to the original policy under Triton despite their protest. If it 
were left to them to enforce the policy they might not have done so with vigor, but the 
contributions of Frontex bound the Italians to the policy. While this was to the benefit of the 
migrants, so they weren’t left at sea or diverted to unsafe ports in other countries, Italy had little 
say over their fate. Under Operation Triton they were at the mercy of the will of the European 
Union, whose policies were enforced by Frontex. Through the enforcement power of Frontex, 
85 Frontex. (1 Feb 2018). ​Frontex launching new operation in central med.​ (Press Release). 
https://frontex.European Unionropa.European 
Union/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-operation-in-central-med-yKqSc7 
86 Barigazzi, J. (7 June 2017, ). Germany rejects Italian proposal to open European Union ports to 
migrants.​ Politico​ Retrieved from ​https://www.politico.European 
Union/article/germany-rejects-italian-proposal-to-open-European Union-ports-to-migrants/ 
87 ​Scherer, S. (1 Feb 2018, ). In new European Union sea mission, ships not obliged to bring 




the European Union was able to implement migration policy which they felt benefitted the whole 
of the European Union at the expense of the national interests of the Italian government. In a 
June press release from the European Commission, they announced that the budget for Frontex 
for the next cycle (which will cover the next 7 years) will be  €34.9 billion. This is an increase of 
over 60% for the previous financial period. This increase in the overall budget encapsulates a 
51% increase in the budget for migration policy from €6.9 billion to €10.4 billion, and an 
increase of more than 200% for border management €2.7 billion to €9.3 billion.  While these 88
increases on their own cannot be taken as evidence of the force of the institution, they can be 
used as a evidence and a piece of the puzzle which shows the European Union contributing 
money and effort into supranational bodies which in practice remove responsibilities and powers 
from member states, in this case in regards to border security and migration.  
The use of Frontex as a border and security policy enforcer shows the strength of the 
European Union in enforcing their policies on individual member states. Frontex is able to 
operate sometimes outside of the public view and so have lesser accountability. Likewise, their 
policies, while necessitating some member state agreement, have the capacity to supersede 
national interests when it comes to border policy in order to protect the whole of the Union. In 
this way, the organization, and the European Union in constructing it have encroached upon 
member states’ sovereign rights over the monopoly of force. Though the European Union does 
require member states to sacrifice rights, there is a larger conclusion to be made here that the 
way the European Union is expressing its power as security and border patrol marks a shift in 
88 European Commission. (12 June 2018). ​Questions and answers: Future European Union 




sovereignty. Sovereign power is shifting from the member states to European Union institutions 
like Frontex.  
The process of European Integration has created an economic and political community 
with strong external borders, while still having the member states within maintain some 
autonomy. The sovereignty of the European Union is conferred upon it through the creation of a 
body politic which engages in debate over the future of the Union. And though the European 
Union does have a strong external border, the territory of the Union is not bounded to a specific 
area and instead is linked to the borders of its member states. These conditions shift the 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty and show that the European Union maintains its 
sovereignty despite diverging from the definition which requires specifically defined territory 
and that the entity is a state body.  
Brexit and the negotiations which have come out of it have also enhanced the argument 
towards the sovereignty of the European Union. By demonstrating that the European Union can 
lack distinct territory and still maintain sovereignty. The UK is threatened by the possibility of 
them being left out of the European economic community and it leaves the European Union 
considerable leverage to control the UK despite their attempts to leave the European Union. The 
European Union is negotiating from a position of power, showing their ability to exert control 
over their own organization and exclude others from the organization if they are not going to 
comply with all of the agreements and concessions required to take part in the benefits.  
The ability of Frontex to shape the actions of member states at the borders of the 
European Union show the power of the Union to enforce the decisions made at the collective 
level on individual member states. Frontex and other aspects of the European Union’s security 
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apparatus remove the monopoly of force from the member states and bestow some of those 
responsibilities onto the European Union. By law, the European Union also does not hold a 
monopoly of force over the area which it governs as member states still have sovereign rights to 
certain aspects of security within their country. But practically, the European Union has the 
power, especially on the borders of the European Union, to act with little regard for internal 
resistance from European Union member states.  
The example of Frontex also shows that in some instances, the European Union is 
overriding state sovereignty. This relationship between the two shows also that EU sovereignty 
and member state sovereignty are not exactly overlapping. Although there are many things that 
are shared, and some responsibilities and abilities of the member states and the EU which are 
discrete and separate, there are some which are meant to be shared, but which in practice become 
overruled and run by the EU despite the protest or actions of member states. The sovereignty 
looks shared, but Frontex is going beyond the shared model and overriding the state powers. This 
demonstrates the strength of the reach of the EU and demonstrates its ability to overrule to the 
sovereignty of the member states.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
European Union sovereignty has diverged from traditional absolute state sovereignty. Its 
non-state character makes it fundamentally different. Additionally, it allows for shared duties and 
powers with member states, creating a sovereignty which is overlapping. European Union 
sovereignty also changes the way the member states control security in their countries and it 
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takes away the monopoly of force. These three main changes in the make up of EU sovereignty 
compared to traditional state sovereignty constitute a new form of sovereignty. The Union, and 
its sovereignty has been given legitimacy by the people of the EU through their buy in and trust 
in the system. The founding documents and pillars of the European Union were not created with 
the idea that the community would become sovereign. But through the evolution of the body, and 
the increasing overlap and take over of the duties and reach of the EU over the member states has 
made the EU a de facto sovereign power.  
A. Implications of EU Sovereignty 
The new form of non-state sovereignty created by the European Union has many benefits. 
The original idea of the European Coal and Steel Community was to make it so no country 
would be able to amass sufficient quantities of weapons and supplies to wage war against any 
other country on the European continent, with particular focus on the previously frequent 
conflicts between Germany and France. The new global economy makes this idea a moot point, 
giving countries the ability to outsource their weapons production and get supplies elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, the European Union has the power, through collective action, to temper the more 
hawkish member states, and leverage influence to let cooler heads prevail and continue the 
original focus of the organization to prevent European war by bringing together the member 
states and linking them in such a way which discourages military action of against one another.  
The same idea of the European Union as a collective entity lessening the influence of 
radical parties within member states is influential as it relates to immigration policy in the 
European Union. ​Luisa Marin notes in her piece on the policing of EU borders that “‘[a]ccess to 
Europe’, ‘the fortress’, is a sensitive political issue for the EU and [member states’] governments 
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nowadays.”  A benefit of the creation of EU sovereignty is the ability that the collective has to 89
temper the opinions of the group. Right wing sentiment has been increasing in individual 
member states in the European Union, but the Union as a whole is doing its level best to keep the 
policy of the Union consistent across member states. This benefits citizens of the EU and people 
from abroad facing dire circumstances and trying to migrate to Europe. Likewise, if extreme 
anti-immigrant sentiment continues and permeates further into the infrastructure of the EU as a 
whole, European Union Sovereignty and the collective voice of the EU could make it difficult 
for more liberal states to push against those policies which they see as going too far in regards to 
immigration or other. 
In its original formation, the European Union wasn’t supposed to gain sovereignty. 
Despite the aim of a European community being to make it impossible for the member states to 
wage war on each other, the Union was still supposed to allow for the sovereignty of its member 
states. But over time the Union has amassed responsibilities and created overlapping 
jurisdictions which take over some functions of the state. Some of the responsibilities are written 
into law in the formational and guiding documents of the European Union, others have 
developed through the extension of the powers of the EU. But on the whole, the sovereignty that 
has been developed by the European Union is not defined by law. It has developed through the 
expansion of powers and the reach of the EU. The sovereignty is de facto, not de jure.  
This condition of de facto sovereignty is revolutionary for the way sovereignty is thought 
of internationally. The creation of sovereignty by a supranational body changes what were 
89 ​ Marin, L. (2014). Policing the EU's external borders: A challenge for the rule of law and 
fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice? An analysis of Frontex joint 
operations at the southern maritime border. 470. 
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considered to be immutable characteristics of states. These changes create cause for the 
international community to rethink the conditions of sovereignty, whether it has to be bounded to 
states or if it can also apply to intra-state bodies. This also applies to other non-state actors in the 
international community. Terrorist organizations like the Taliban fit the categories laid out in this 
paper for having their own sovereignty. They are a non-state actor, in some areas they provide 
essential services to citizens, and they remove the monopoly of force within their controlled 
territory from official state control. If the conditions for European Union sovereignty apply to 
other non-state bodies around the world, it raises the question of whether or not those bodies 
should be given power and weight in the international system, and be officially recognized 
within the systems of power. Whether or not this is a positive change, it should give us pause to 
consider the many actors in the international system and whether or not they could fall under the 
umbrella of having become de facto sovereign, and whether or not this means they should be 
treated differently in how they are dealt with in the international system.  
B. The Difference in Regulation 
The shared sovereignty between the the member states and the European Union is not 
equal and it is not the same in all areas of governing. The expressions of shared sovereignty that 
come out in the de jure shared duties of the EU and the member states are clearly regulated and 
governed by treaties such as the ​Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. ​The duties of 
the member states and the EU are specified and separate, but shared. But the example of Frontex 
displays the fundamentally different character of the shared responsibilities of the member states 
and the EU as a whole.  
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Table 1 shows the different responsibilities of member states and the EU and shows that 
those assigned to each party are carried out as they should be, but that those responsibilities 
meant to be shaed can be overshadowed by the influence of the EU. In the area of border 
security, the EU has eclipsed the role of the member states in some places. The idea that the EU 
and the member states would each have their own responsibilities and powers created the 
precedent for shared responsibility and eventually opened the door for the expansion of powers 
and responsibilities of the EU and its eventual sovereignty.  
The question asked in this paper, ​how does the existence of non-state sovereignty exist 
and interact with existing state sovereignty?, is not answered simply. This paper shows that the 
overlapping nature of the sovereignty between the EU and the member states creates for a messy 
situation and unclear boundary lines of who is responsible for what. In the arrangement that the 
member states and the EU share responsibilities, there is also a lot of opportunity for the EU to 
expand their powers through the mechanisms which made some responsibilities shared.  
The EU having a type of non-state sovereignty could have significant implications across 
Europe. But it could be particularly strong in places where the state is already weak. In periphery 
EU countries, like in Greece, the EU is becoming stronger with the expansion of their border 
control duties. If this is to continue it is possible that the EU could start to become more 
sovereign than the member state. This might change how states wanting to enter the EU view the 
benefits they would get from membership, versus the trade offs and sacrifices they would have to 
make to become members. Though while the strengthening of EU sovereignty could have quite 
major impacts for weaker member states, the stronger states which we tend to think of as major 
players in the EU would likely be impacted much less by the strengthening of EU sovereignty. 
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These stronger member states like France and Germany are more interior in Europe. The EU has 
less to do in a state like Germany in regards to external border security, and thus has less ability 
to expand their powers, and less cause for encroaching upon the stated responsibilities of that 
member state.  
The relationship of EU non state sovereignty to existing member state sovereignty is 
fraught and complicated. It overlaps in places, and expands past its stated boundaries in others. 
The concept of shared and overlapping, non state sovereignty is important for the EU and its 
member states to consider as it evaluates the responsibilities of each, and determines its priorities 
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